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The link between political and economic governance has been the subject of debate at 
least since Aristotle in 4
th century BC. Aristotle thought that democracy functioned well 
in the absence of poverty, and hence that economic prosperity led to democracy. In 
contrast, twenty centuries later Montesquieu supported the view that checks on the 
powers of government are a pre-requisite for good economic governance and prosperity. 
In more recent times, one can find examples of authoritarian as well as democratic 
regimes that implemented major economic reforms. For example, successful economic 
liberalization was achieved under the military regimes in Argentina (1966 and 1976), 
Chile (1973), Brazil (1964), and Uruguay (1976), and under authoritarian regimes in 
China (1978), Vietnam (1993), Saudi Arabia (2006) and Azerbaijan (2008). Reform has 
also been achieved under democratic regimes in Australia (1983), Colombia (1986, 
1991), New Zealand (1984), Spain (1977-1978), Poland (1992), Estonia (1993), Slovakia 
(1998-2000), Georgia (2004-2008), and FYR Macedonia (2007-2008). 
  The existing economics literature on the relationship between democracy and 
reform revolves around the experience of countries with macroeconomic stabilization 
efforts in the 1970s. It is largely based on case studies (see, for example, Williamson 
1994, Nelson 1990, Bates and Krueger 1993). While this literature does not reach a 
consensus on whether democracy promotes reform, it highlights the argument that 
reforms are often unpopular because they tend to reduce living standards in the short run. 
Even reforms that increase overall prosperity (measured in GDP growth) may be 
unpopular if compensation schemes for the losers are not credible; and if benefits are far 
in the future and costs more immediate (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991, Rodrik 1996).  
  2These problems with democracy are compounded by the fact that democracies 
offer more channels of protest and influence on policymaking to subordinate groups than 
authoritarian regimes; and that they create more favorable conditions for the development 
of strong and independent sector and non-government organizations capable of resisting 
reform efforts (Remmer, 1986). Lastly, democratic rule may fragment decision-making 
authority among branches of government, allowing opponents of reform to interfere more 
easily with program design. 
 In  contrast,  authoritarian governments have less need to respond to either popular 
opinion or vested interests and hence can more readily base their decision on criteria of 
economic rationality. They are better able to make long-run plans than are democratic 
governments tied to electoral cycles; and have greater centralization of power that 
facilitates the implementation of reforms.  
However, these supposed advantages of authoritarianism are not without their 
problems. For example, to the extent that policy information and feedback are vital to the 
design of reforms, democracies may have an advantage (Remmer 1986); autocratic rulers 
do not have to worry about re-election and hence it is not clear what their incentive to 
reform is; losers from reforms may comply with their defeat because they believe that the 
institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit them to 
advance their interest in the future (Przeworski 1991). 
In this paper we provide analysis of the link between democracy and reforms. In 
particular, we study the relationship between micro-economic reforms, shown in previous 
studies (for example, Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) and Barseghyan (2008)) to 
expand growth, and the level of democracy. The analysis is done on a sample of 147 
  3countries, with data on micro-economic reforms drawn from the World Bank’s Doing 
Business project.  
Our data are not subject to the criticisms on other measures of economic 
institutions, which suffer from significant endogeneity issues, and measure outcomes 
rather than institutions (for example, Glaeser et al 2004). The Doing Business data are 
focused on specific regulatory or legal reforms, and as such they are a better indicator of 
underlying institutions. At the same time, they are sufficiently micro-measured so as to 
avoid the possibility of such reforms affecting the level of democracy. 
  We find robust evidence for the link between democracy and growth-enhancing 
reforms. The estimates imply that a move from below-average to above-average level of 
democracy increases the probability of reform by 20.4 percentage points, a large effect 
given that the mean value of the dependent variable is 55.1%. Higher-end estimates 
imply an increase of 28.6 percentage points in the probability of a reform in moving from 
below- to above-average level of democracy.  
Using a continuous measure of democracy, we find that moving from the lowest 
to the highest value on the democracy scale increases the probability of reform by 17 to 
35 percentage points. Finally, using an alternative measure of democracy, we find that 
democracy increases the likelihood of growth-enhancing reform by a high of 40 
percentage points and a low of 16 percentage points. These results are robust to the 
inclusion of various proxies for the initial institutional environment, controlling for per 
capita income, and restricting the sample to developing countries. 
  4  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
main variables. Section 3 shows the main regression results, Section 4 provides 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Description of data 
The sample consists of 147 countries for which information on our main variables is 
available. The time period covered by the study is 2003-2008. In the analysis we utilize 
several sources of data including the World Bank’s Doing Business project and World 
Development Indicators, Polity IV, Freedom House, Djankov et al. (2007), and La Porta 
et al. (1999). A definition of all variables and their sources is provided in Table 1. 
Summary statistics and correlations between the main variables are provided in Tables 2 
and 3, respectively. 
 
2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is based on data collected by the World Bank’s Doing Business 
project. As part of its annual exercise, Doing Business compiles ten sets of indicators 
covering various aspects of the business climate including starting a business, paying 
taxes, obtaining licenses, getting credit, protecting investors, employing workers, 
international trade, property registration, closing a business and enforcement of private 
contracts. Information is also available on an annual basis on important reforms on each 
of these indicators. This information is coded as a dummy variable which equals 1 if a 
country implemented a positive reform during the year on a given indicator and 0 
otherwise. A positive reform, as defined in Doing Business, is one that makes it faster, 
  5cheaper or administratively easier for local businesses to start and run operations; or a 
reform that defines and increases the protection of property rights. An example is 
reducing the number of days to get an industry license, eliminating the minimum capital 
requirement for start-ups, or increasing the legal rights of creditors and minority 
shareholders.  
Using this dataset, we define the main dependent variable, Reform, as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a positive reform occurred in one or more of the ten indicators in a 
given year and 0 otherwise. The mean value of the variable equals 0.55 and the standard 
deviation is 0.50 (Table 2). For robustness, we also report all results using an alternative 
measure that equals (log of 1 plus) the number of indicators on which a positive reform 
occurred during a given year (Number of Reforms). For example, in 2005, Turkey 
implemented reforms in paying taxes and international trade implying a score of (log of 1 
plus) 2 for the dependent variable. The two dependent variables are highly correlated 
(correlation of 0.877). 
  Information on changes in the quality of the business environment is also 
available from alternative sources such as Heritage Foundation’s Freedom of the World 
Index or Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World. One could use annual 
changes in these data to construct a measure of reform similar to the ones described 
above. However, the Doing Business data offer two advantages. First, unlike other data 
sources that are based in part on experts’ perceptions, the Doing Business data are based 
on actual reforms. This allows us to interpret the findings in terms of specific reforms that 
are more (or less) likely under a democratic vs. non-democratic environment. Second, 
and more important, since the Doing Business data cover a specific set of policy reforms, 
  6reverse causality from our dependent variable to democracy is unlikely. It is difficult, for 
example, to imagine that the enactment of a more efficient bankruptcy law would 
influence the societal bend towards democracy. In contrast, other available indicators of 
the business environment are aggregate or macro level measures. A possible feedback 
effect from macro level changes in the business environment to the quality of democracy 
is plausible. This problem is identified in Glaeser et al. (2004), among others. 
 
2.2 Explanatory variables 
Democracy 
The main explanatory variable is a measure of the level of democracy. We use data from 
Polity IV and Freedom House to construct three separate measures of democracy. The 
“democracy” variable in the Polity IV data provides a score between 0 and 10 for each 
country with higher scores implying a better quality of democracy. In our sample, 
countries with the highest level of democracy include Costa Rica, Mauritius, Mongolia, 
the Netherlands and United States, while Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Vietnam and 
Sudan show the lowest level of democracy.  
The democracy scores from Polity IV are available on an annual basis but there is 
little time variation in these scores over our sample period. Hence, we use scores in year 
2003, the beginning of the sample period, to construct Democracy, our main measure of 
democracy. It equals 1 for a country with a score of 5 or higher (high democracy) and 0 
otherwise (low democracy). To check that our results are not sensitive to the high and 
low democracy classification, we report all results using the democracy scores on the full 
  70-10 scale (Democracy 2). The mean value of Democracy equals 0.62 and the standard 
deviation is 0.49. 
The third measure of democracy we use is based on data from Freedom House. It 
equals the average of the Political Rights index and the Civil Liberty index for the year 
2003 (Democracy 3). According to Democracy 3, Australia, Chile, Mauritius, Norway, 
and United States are most democratic in our sample, while the least democratic countries 
are China, Eritrea, Sudan, Vietnam and Uzbekistan. The three democracy measures 
defined above are highly correlated with each other (Table 3). 
These two sources of democracy data have been used in the previous studies in 
this field: Barro (1997), La Porta et al (1999), Rodrik (1999), and Glaeser et al. (2004). 
 
Other determinants of reform 
The proclivity to reform is likely to depend on the quality of the broader economic 
institutions that may determine how governments behave. We check for the robustness of 
the democracy-reform relationship by controlling for a number of alternative proxy 
measures of broader economic institutions suggested in the previous literature. 
We begin by controlling for differences in income levels across countries using 
(log of) GDP per capita in 2003 taken from Penn World Tables. The quality of 
democracy is typically better in higher income countries (Table 3). We may also expect 
higher income countries to reform more because these countries have greater capacity for 
reform, more checks and balances on the government that prevent the use of business 
regulations by politicians for generating rents, etc. 
  8  Second, another strand of the literature highlights a strong relationship between 
the quality of institutions and geography related factors (Gallup et al. 1998). Following 
this body of work, we use two sets of controls for geography. The first is the absolute 
distance of a country from the equator divided by 90 (Latitude). The second is region 
fixed effects where regions include East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean 
(LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), North America, South Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and the omitted category of Europe and Central Asia (ECA). 
Classification of countries into these regions is taken from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. 
Third, micro-economic reforms are unlikely to be of much use and hence unlikely 
to be implemented if the broader institutional environment does not provide adequate 
security and protection of private investment. We control for this factor using the Rule of 
Law measure taken from World Bank’s Governance indicators (year 2003 values). The 
measure broadly captures respect for private property, incidence of crime and 
enforceability of private and government contracts.  
Fourth, there is now substantial evidence showing that the legal tradition of a 
country is a strong proxy for various aspects of the institutional environment. For 
example, Djankov et al. (2002) show that entry barriers are much lower in English 
common law relative to the French civil law countries. Similar findings are reported for 
shareholder rights (Djankov et al. 2008), contract enforcement (Djankov et al. 2003) and 
the flexibility of labor markets (Botero et al. 2004). We control for the legal tradition of a 
country using dummy indicators for the legal tradition of a country. These traditions 
  9include French, German, Scandinavian, Socialist and the omitted category of English 
common law. The data source for the variable is Djankov et al (2007). 
Fifth, starting with the seminal work of Max Weber, a number of studies have 
highlighted the importance of religion in shaping the quality of institutions. For example, 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that the low level of creditors’ protection present in 
Catholic countries is most likely due to the anti-usury culture pervasive in the Catholic 
tradition. Following this literature, we use dummy indicators identifying the main 
religious group in the country as either Muslim or Catholic, Protestant and the residual 
category of all other religions. The data source for these indicators is La Porta et al. 
(1999).  
  Consistent with the literature discussed above, we find a strong link between 
some of the control variables discussed above and reform. Nevertheless, the positive 
relationship between democracy and reform easily survives these controls. Figure 1 
provides a graphical illustration of the democracy-reform linkage controlling for GDP per 
capita and regional fixed effects. 
 
3. Main empirical results 
The main empirical results are provided in Table 4. The estimated coefficient values and 
their significance levels are obtained using a logit specification with Huber-White robust 
standard errors clustered on the country. Without any additional controls, the estimated 
coefficient of Democracy equals 0.828, significant at the 1% level (column 1). The 
coefficient estimate implies that a move from below-average to above-average level of 
  10democracy increases the probability of reform by 20.4 percentage points, a large effect 
given that the mean value of the dependent variable equals 55.1%. 
  The estimated coefficient of the democracy variable remains large and statistically 
significant when we control for various proxies of the initial level of institutions 
(columns 2-7). The coefficient value is lowest when we control for Latitude equaling 
0.638, significant at the 1% level (column 3). 
Controlling for the legal origin of countries, region fixed effects and Rule of Law 
lowers the estimated coefficient of democracy but it remains significant at 1% level 
(columns 4, 5 and 7, Table 4). The largest impact on the estimated coefficient of 
Democracy occurs when we control for religion fixed effects. It rises from 0.828 (column 
1) to 1.178 (significant at the 1% level) due to the religion controls (column 6). The latter 
implies an increase of 28.6 percentage points in the probability of a reform in moving 
from below- to above average level of democracy.  
Among other factors, we find that, controlling for the level of democracy, reform 
is significantly more likely in countries that are more distant from the equator and those 
in the Middle East and North Africa region and in Europe and Central Asia. Chances of 
reform are significantly lower for countries that follow the English common law relative 
to all other legal traditions and for countries where the majority are either Catholic or 
Protestant relative to the rest (Muslim and All other religions). 
In sum, democracy is associated with micro-economic reforms, and this 
association remains strong when we control for various measures of institutional quality. 
 
 
  114. Robustness 
First, we repeat the regression exercise using the full (0-10) democracy scale. The 
relationship between democracy and reform holds (Table 5). As above, it is weaker in 
magnitude but still significant at the 1% level when we control for Latitude, region fixed 
effects and the legal origin of countries. Based on the estimated coefficients, moving 
from the lowest to the highest value on the democracy scale increases the probability of 
reform by 17.1-35.5 percentage points. 
  Second, we report regression results using the OLS estimation method for the 
total number of reforms as the dependent variable (Table 6). The main results hold. 
Without any other controls, a move from low to high democracy increases the (log) 
number of reforms by 0.212 (column 1, Table 6) or 38.5% of the mean value of the 
dependent variable. The corresponding increase as a percentage of the mean value of the 
dependent variable equals a high of 53.9% with the religion fixed effects (column 6, 
Table 6) and a low of 27.7% with the region fixed effects (column 5, Table 6). 
  Next, we use the third measure of democracy from Freedom House (Table 7). 
These results are similar to the ones discussed above. The democracy-reform relationship 
is economically large and statistically significant at the 5% level when we control for 
Latitude and region fixed effects and at the 1% level in other specifications. Estimates in 
the table imply that moving from the lowest to the highest value of Democracy 3 
increases the probability of reform by 27.2 percentage points with no additional controls 
(column 1), a high of 40.3 percentage points with the religion fixed effects (column 6) 
and a low of 16 percentage points when we control for region fixed effects (column 5). 
  12  Fourth, we check for the stability of the democracy-reform relationship by 
restricting the sample to developing countries (109 countries in our sample). We follow 
the World Bank’s definition of a developing country as one with a GNI per capita of less 
than $11,456 in 2007, roughly the income level of Hungary or Antigua and Barbuda. 
Regression results provided in Table 8 show that democracy has a positive and 
significant effect on growth-enhancing reforms in the developing countries although the 
magnitude of the effect is smaller than in the full sample. 
  Finally, we performed a number of additional robustness checks on the results 
reported in Tables 4-8. These checks include following Rodrik (1999) in controlling for 
the primary and secondary gross enrollment rates (from World Development Indicators, 
World Bank), controlling for GDP per capita in all specifications, restricting the sample 
to the set of high-income and middle income countries (following World Bank’s 
classification of countries by income levels), controlling for the initial (year 2003) level 
of regulation using the Heritage Foundation’s Business Freedom index and controlling 
for the (log of) settler mortality rate from Acemoglu et al. (2001). The relationship 
between democracy and reform remain robust to all these checks except when we 
controlled for the settler mortality rate, a result most likely due to the smaller sample size 
(we lose 87 countries, which have no data on settler mortality). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The last two decades have seen rapid growth in both Africa and the former socialist 
economies in Eastern Europe. With democracy also expanding significantly in both 
  13regions, the link between the level of democracy and growth-enhancing reforms is 
receiving renewed interest.  
  This study expands the previous literature based on anecdotal evidence and case 
studies of countries while using new and improved data. The findings confirm the earlier 
case study results that an expansion of democratic rights encourages micro-economic 
reforms and is likely to increase efficiency and growth. 
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The figure is a partial scatter plot showing the relationship between Reform and Democracy on average over the sample period, and controlling for GDP per 
capita and regional fixed effects. The Y axis plots the residuals from the linear regression of Reform on the control variables while the X axis contains residuals 
from a similar regression using Democracy. Both these regressions are run over average values of all the variables taken over the sample period (2003-2008). 
Abbreviations of country names follow World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
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Table 1: Description of variables 
Variable Description 
Reform  Dummy equal to 1 if a country implemented one or more reform during the year and 0 otherwise. Source: Doing 
Business, www.doingbusiness.org. 
Number of reforms  Log of 1 plus the total number of reforms for a given country-year. Source: Doing Business. 
Democracy  Dummy equal to 1 if a country has a democracy score of 5 or higher in 2003 and 0 otherwise. Source: Polity IV. 
Democracy 2  Democracy score in 2003. Source: Polity IV. 
Democracy 3  Average of the Political rights and Civil Liberty index for the year 2003 from Freedom House. Source: Freedom House. 
GDP per capita  Log of GDP per capita in 2003. Source: Penn World Tables. 
Latitude  Absolute distance of a country from the equator divided by 90. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Rule of Law  Values of Rule of Law index in 2003. Source: World Bank. www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data 
Regions   
Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA) 
Dummy indicating a country in Europe or Central Asia region. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
East Asia and Pacific  Dummy indicating a country in East Asia or Pacific region. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) 
Dummy indicating a country in Latin America or Caribbean region. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) 
Dummy indicating a country in Middle East or North Africa region. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
North America  Dummy indicating a country in North America region. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
South Asia  Dummy indicating a country in South Asia region. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) 
Dummy indicating a country in Sub-Saharan Africa region. Source: WDI, World Bank. 
Legal origin, religions   
English legal origin  Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on the English common law. Source: Djankov et al. (2007). 
French legal origin  Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on the French civil law. Source: Djankov et al. (2007). 
German legal origin  Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on German civil law. Source: Djankov et al. (2007). 
Scandinavian legal origin  Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on Scandinavian legal system. Source: Djankov et al. (2007). 
Socialist legal origin  Dummy indicating a country's legal system is Socialist. Source: Djankov et al. (2007). 
Muslim  Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Islam. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Catholic  Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Catholicism. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Protestant  Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Protestantism. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
All other religions  Dummy indicating main religion is other than Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism. Source: La Porta et al. (1999).  
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum Observations Countries
Reform  0.551 0.498  0  1  735  147 
Number of reforms (log)  0.552 0.561  0  2.08  735  147 
Democracy  0.619 0.486  0  1  735  147 
Democracy 2  5.483 3.867  0  10  735  147 
Democracy 3  3.293 1.901  0  6  735  147 
GDP per capita (log)  8.540 1.190  5.84  10.50  710  142 
Latitude  0.297 0.190  0.01  0.71  735  147 
Rule of Law  -0.129 0.980  -1.73  1.97  735  147 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA)  0.279 0.449  0  1  735  147 
East Asia and Pacific  0.122 0.328  0  1  735  147 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)  0.150 0.357  0  1  735  147 
Middle East and  
North Africa (MENA) 
0.116 0.320  0  1  735  147 
North America  0.014 0.116  0  1  735  147 
South Asia  0.041 0.198  0  1  735  147 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  0.279 0.449  0  1  735  147 
English legal origin  0.308 0.462  0  1  715  143 
French legal origin  0.476 0.500  0  1  715  143 
German legal origin  0.112 0.315  0  1  715  143 
Scandinavian legal origin  0.028 0.165  0  1  715  143 
Socialist legal origin  0.077 0.267  0  1  715  143 
Muslim  0.279 0.449  0  1  735  147 
Catholic  0.333 0.472  0  1  735  147 
Protestant  0.143 0.350  0  1  735  147 
All other religions  0.245 0.430  0  1  735  147 
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Table 3: Correlation between main variables 
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b (5% or less) and 
c (10% or less). 
 Table 4: Determinants of Reform 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per capita    0.036           
(log  values)    (0.664)       
Latitude     2.075
a      
     (0.000)        
Rule of Law        0.058       
       (0.583)      
East Asia and Pacific        -1.128
a    
         (0.000)     
LAC         -1.291
a    
         (0.000)     
Middle East and North Africa        -0.774
b    
         (0.045)     
North America          -2.205
a    
         (0.000)     
South Asia          -0.873
c    
         (0.083)     
Sub Saharan Africa          -1.305
a    
         (0.000)     
Muslim         -0.064   
         (0.818)   
Catholic         -0.477
b   
         (0.046)   
Protestant         -0.993
a   
         (0.001)   
French  legal  origin          0.669
a 
          (0.002) 
German legal origin              1.165
a 
          (0.000) 
Scandinavian legal origin            0.702
c 
          (0.085) 
Socialist legal origin            1.598
a 
          (0.000) 
Constant -0.302
c -0.597  -0.788
a -0.267 0.663
a  -0.192 -0.769
a 
 (0.052)  (0.355)  (0.000)  (0.120) (0.004) (0.394) (0.000) 
Observations  735  710 735 735 735 735 715 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. 
Significance level denoted by: 
a (1% or less), 
b (5% or less) and 
c (10% or less). 
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Table 5: Determinants of Reform 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) 









  (0.000)  (0.001) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.000)  (0.000) 
GDP per capita  0.005           
(log values)    (0.954)           
Latitude     2.01
a        
     (0.000)         
Rule of Law        -0.006       
       (0.962)       
East Asia and Pacific        -1.150
a    
        (0.000)    
LAC      
  -1.224
a    
        (0.000)    
Middle East and North Africa      -0.856
b    
        (0.026)    
North  America        -2.275
a    
        (0.000)    
South  Asia        -0.825    
        (0.101)    
Sub  Saharan  Africa      -1.300
a    
        (0.000)    
Muslim          -0.075   
          (0.790)   
Catholic          -0.485
c  
          (0.054)   
Protestant          -0.97
a  
          (0.002)   
French  legal  origin          0.695
a 
            (0.001) 
German legal origin            1.105
a 
            (0.001) 
Scandinavian legal origin            0.569 
            (0.171) 
Socialist legal origin            1.705
a 





a -0.25  -0.85
a 
  (0.047)  (0.580) (0.000) (0.097) (0.006) (0.311)  (0.000) 
Observations  735  710 735 735  735  735 715 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. 
Significance level denoted by: 
a (1% or less), 
b (5% or less) and 
c (10% or less). 
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Table 6: Robustness of Reforms Variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









  (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) (0.003) 
GDP  per  capita  0.007       
(log  values)  (0.745)       
Latitude     0.523
a      
     (0.001)      
Rule  of  Law     -0.003     
      (0.922)     
East Asia and Pacific      -0.304
a    
       (0.000)    
LAC       -0.325
a    
       (0.000)    
Middle East and North Africa      -0.224
b    
       (0.042)    
North  America      -0.587
a    
       (0.000)    
South  Asia      -0.258
b    
       (0.049)    
Sub  Saharan  Africa      -0.341
a    
       (0.000)    
Muslim        -0.061   
        ( 0 . 4 2 0 )    
Catholic        -0.148
b  
        ( 0 . 0 3 9 )    
Protestant       -0.31
a  
        ( 0 . 0 0 0 )    
French  legal  origin        0.178
a 
         ( 0 . 0 0 2 )  
German  legal  origin        0.364
a 
         ( 0 . 0 0 0 )  
Scandinavian  legal  origin       0.125 
         ( 0 . 3 1 9 )  
Socialist  legal  origin        0.485
a 









  (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  735 710 735 735 735 735 715 
R-squared  0.034 0.037 0.063 0.034 0.101  0.06  0.093 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the 
country. Significance level denoted by: 
a (1% or less), 
b (5% or less) and 
c (10% or less). 
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Table 7: Robustness of Democracy Variable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: Reform       








  (0.000) (0.002) (0.041) (0.006) (0.048) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP  per  capita  0.004       
(log  values)  (0.967)       
Latitude     2.066
a      
     (0.000)      
Rule  of  Law     -0.047     
      (0.725)     
East Asia and Pacific      -1.128
a    
       (0.000)    
LAC       -1.184
a    
       (0.000)    
Middle East and North Africa      -1.002
a    
       (0.008)    
North  America      -2.270
a    
       (0.000)    
South  Asia      -0.909
c    
       (0.074)    
Sub  Saharan  Africa     -1.386
a    
       (0.000)    
Muslim        -0.182   
        ( 0 . 5 1 7 )    
Catholic        -0.512
b  
        ( 0 . 0 4 6 )    
Protestant       -1.03
a  
        ( 0 . 0 0 1 )    
French  legal  origin        0.707
a 
         ( 0 . 0 0 1 )  
German  legal  origin       1.133
a 
         ( 0 . 0 0 1 )  
Scandinavian  legal  origin       0.511 
         ( 0 . 2 2 4 )  
Socialist  legal  origin       1.762
a 







  (0.051) (0.520) (0.001) (0.099) (0.003) (0.251) (0.000) 
Observations  735 710 735 735 735 735 715 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the 
country. Significance level denoted by: 
a (1% or less), 
b (5% or less) and 
c (10% or less). 
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Table 8: Robustness for the sample of Developing countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 









  (0.002) (0.020) (0.003) (0.026) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.008) 
GDP per capita  0.251
b          
(log values)  (0.041)           
Latitude     2.775
a        
     (0.000)         
Rule of Law      0.323       
       (0.146)       
East Asia and Pacific      -1.331
a    
       (0.002)    
LAC       -1.593
a    
       (0.000)    
Middle East and North Africa      -0.62     
       (0.204)    
South Asia        -1.195
b    
       (0.019)    
Sub Saharan Africa        -1.609
a    
       (0.000)    
Muslim        -0.032   
        (0.913)   
Catholic        -0.636
b  
        (0.020)   
Protestant         -1.34
a  
        (0.001)   
French legal origin            0.551
b 
         (0.022) 
German legal origin            2.077
a 
         (0.000) 
Socialist legal origin            1.547
a 
         (0.000) 





  (0.223) (0.019) (0.000) (0.804) (0.000) (0.738)  (0.002) 
Observations 545 520 545 545 545 545 535 
p-values in brackets. All standard errors are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. 
Significance level denoted by: 
a (1% or less), 
b (5% or less) and 
c (10% or less). The sample of 
countries in the Table consists of developing countries as classified by World Bank (GNI per capita 
of less than $11, 456 in 2007). 
 